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Summary
Since 1995, the United States has provided over $1 billion in foreign assistance to
the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea).
About 60% has taken the form of food aid and about 40% was energy assistance
channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
the multilateral organization established in 1994 to provide energy aid in exchange for
North Korea’s pledge of that year to halt its existing nuclear program.  This report
provides statistical details of U.S. aid to North Korea, including the $100,000 pledged
in April 2004 to help survivors of a massive train explosion in the northwestern town
of Ryongchon.  As the table in the report shows, U.S. assistance to North Korea has
fallen significantly over the past two years.  In the fall of 2004, the North Korean
government began restricting the activities of many humanitarian activities, including
some of those by the World Food Program (WFP).  Administration officials, including
President Bush, have indicated that United States assistance might be forthcoming if
North Korea began dismantling its nuclear programs, a subject being discussed in the
six-party talks.  The 108th Congress passed, and President Bush signed, H.R. 4011 (P.L.
108-333), the North Korean Human Rights Act, which includes hortatory language
calling for “significant increases” above current levels of U.S. support for humanitarian
assistance to be conditioned upon “substantial improvements” in transparency,
monitoring, and access.  Pyongyang has cited the Act as evidence of the United States’
“hostile policy” toward North Korea and has used it as justification to suspend its
participation in the six-party talks.
This report will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid
to North Korea. A more extended description and analysis of aid to North Korea,
including assistance provided by other countries, is provided in CRS Report RL31785,
U.S. Assistance to North Korea, by Mark Manyin. 
Food Aid 
Since 1996, the United States has sent just over 2 million metric tons (MT) of food
assistance, worth about $675 million, to help North Korea alleviate chronic, massive food
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shortages that began in the early 1990s and that led to severe famine in the mid-1990s, killing
an estimated 600,000-2 million North Koreans.  Over 90% of U.S. food assistance to
Pyongyang has been channeled through the UN World Food Program (WFP), which has sent
over 3.6 million metric tons (MT) of food to the DPRK since 1996.  The U.S. is by far the
largest contributor to the WFP’s North Korea appeals.  China is widely believed to have
provided even more food than the United States.  China sends its food aid directly to North
Korea, rather than through the WFP.  Since 2002, South Korea has been a major provider of
food assistance, perhaps surpassing China in importance in some years.  Most of Seoul’s food
shipments are provided bilaterally to Pyongyang.  The WFP has said that although North
Korea’s domestic food production particularly has stabilized it appears to have become acute
for certain groups of North Koreans, industrial workers living in the northern and northeastern
provinces that historically have been discriminated against by the communist government in
Pyongyang.   This situation appears to have been worsened by the steep rise in food prices —
the WFP estimates the cost of cereals such as rice to have tripled in 2004 — that have
followed economic reforms enacted in 2002.
U.S. shipments of food aid have fallen significantly in the past two years, as have
donations from most other contributors to the WFP’s North Korea appeals.  Assistance
provided by the WFP has fallen by more than half since 2001, from over 900,000 MT in 2001
to about 360,000 MT in 2003. “Donor fatigue” is cited as the primary reason for the decline,
as contributing nations have objected to the North Korean government’s tight restrictions on
the ability of donor agencies to monitor food shipments.  Increased bilateral donations from
China and South Korea, as well as  improved harvests in North Korea, appear to have made
up much of the gap, which is estimated to be in the range of one to two million MT per year.
The Bush Administration announced in February 2003 that it would provide 40,000 MT of
food assistance to North Korea, with up to an additional 60,000 MT to be provided if the
DPRK allows greater access and monitoring.  On December 24, 2003, the State Department
announced that the United States had decided to donate 60,000 MT to the WFP’s 2003 North
Korea appeal.  On July 23, 2004, the State Department announced a 50,000 MT contribution
to the WFP’s 2004 North Korea appeal.  In both cases, the stated reason for providing the
additional amount was the continued poor humanitarian situation in North Korea.  The official
announcements also referred to marginal improvements in North Korea’s cooperation with
the WFP on access and monitoring.
In the fall of 2004, the North Korean government began restricting the activities of many
humanitarian activities, particularly those of non-governmental relief organizations.  North
Korea authorities also reportedly have pressured the WFP to curtail its post-distribution
monitoring visits to North Korean households, and — after years of allowing increased access
and monitoring — have begun denying monitoring visits in a number of geographic areas.1
This has led the WFP, under its “no access, no food” policy, to suspend its operation in
several counties; as of late January 2005, 154 of 203 counties were accessible, compared with
161 of 203 counties in early 2004.   For 2005, the WFP says its goal is to reach the same
number of vulnerable people, 6.5 million, as it did in 2004.2  
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1995 0 $0.0 $9.5 $0.2 $9.7
1996 19,500 $8.3 $22.0 $0.0 $30.3
1997 177,000 $52.4 $25.0 $5.0 $82.4
1998 200,000 $72.9 $50.0 $0.0 $122.9
1999 695,194 $222.1 $65.1 $0.0 $287.2
2000 265,000 $74.3 $64.4 $0.0 $138.7
2001 350,000 $102.8 $74.9 $0.0 $177.6
2002 207,000 $82.4 $90.5 $0.0 $172.9
2003 40,200 $25.5 $2.3 $0.0 $27.8
2004 110,000 $52.8 $0.0 $0.1 $52.9
2005  —  —  —  —  — 
Total 2,063,894 $693.5 $403.7 $5.3 $1,102.4
Sources:  Figures for food aid and medical supplies from USAID and US Department of Agriculture; KEDO
(Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) figures from KEDO.
Energy and Other Forms of Assistance
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).  Since
1995, the United States has provided over $400 million in energy assistance to North
Korea under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the DPRK agreed to halt
its existing plutonium-based nuclear program in exchange for energy aid from the United
States and other countries.  Aid to the (KEDO was dramatically curtailed after October
2002, when North Korea reportedly admitted that it had a secret uranium enrichment
program.  In response, North Korea demanded new negotiations with the United States
and restarted a number of nuclear facilities that were mothballed under the Agreed
Framework, creating a major foreign policy problem for the United States and the
DPRK’s neighbors.  Anticipated U.S. funding for KEDO has been cut to zero in FY2004.
In November 2003, KEDO’s Executive Board (the United States, South Korea, Japan, and
the European Union) decided to suspend the KEDO project for one year, a decision that
was repeated in November 2004.  The Bush Administration’s position is that it would like
to permanently end the KEDO program.3
Proposals Linked to North Korea’s Nuclear Program and the Six-Party
Talks.  Administration officials, including President Bush, have indicated  that  U.S.
assistance might be forthcoming if North Korea began dismantling its nuclear programs.
In January 2003, President Bush said that he would consider offering the DPRK a “bold
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initiative” including energy and agricultural development aid if the country first verifiably
dismantles its nuclear program and satisfies other U.S. security concerns dealing with
missiles and the deployment of conventional forces.4  In June 2004, during the third round
of six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States tabled a
proposal that envisioned a freeze of North Korea’s weapons program, followed by a series
of measures to ensure complete dismantlement and, eventually, a permanent security
guarantee, negotiations to resolve North Korea’s energy problems, and discussions on
normalizing U.S.-North Korean relations that would include lifting the remaining U.S.
sanctions and removing North Korea from the list of terrorist-supporting countries.  In the
interim, Japan and South Korea would provide the North with heavy oil.
The North Korean Human Rights Act  
In the fall of 2004, the 108th Congress passed and President Bush signed H.R. 4011
(P.L. 108-333), the North Korean Human Rights Act.   The act: 
! calls for human rights in North Korea to be “a key element in future
negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other
concerned parties in Northeast Asia;” 
! requires the President to appoint a special envoy for human rights in
North Korea; 
! requires that U.S. non-humanitarian assistance to North Korea be
contingent upon North Korea making “substantial progress” on a number
of specific human rights issues.  
! includes hortatory language calling for “significant increases” above
current levels of U.S. support for humanitarian assistance to be
conditioned upon “substantial improvements” in transparency,
monitoring, and access;
! requires the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) to issue a report to Congress on  humanitarian assistance
activities to North Korea and North Koreans in China that receive U.S.
funding, and any changes in the transparency, monitoring, and access of
food aid and other humanitarian activities;
! authorizes but does not appropriate a total of $24 million annually for the
next four years for programs that promote human rights and democracy,
freedom of information, and assistance to North Koreans in China,
including the dissemination of transistor radios inside North Korea; 
! clarifies that North Koreans living outside of North Korea are eligible for
refugee status or asylum in the United States
 
Pyongyang has cited P.L.108-333 as evidence of the United States’ “hostile policy”
toward North Korea, and has used it as justification to suspend its participation in the six-
party talks.
